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 Why and How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided O’Bannon v NCAA 
Matthew J. Mitten* 
Abstract 
Despite requests by both parties, the United States Supreme Court refused to grant a writ of 
certiorari in O’Bannon v. NCAA, the first federal appellate court decision holding that an NCAA 
student-athlete eligibility rule violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The Ninth Circuit ruled that 
NCAA rules prohibiting intercollegiate athletes from receiving any revenue from videogames 
and telecasts incorporating their names, images, or likenesses unreasonably restrain economic 
competition among its member universities in the college education market in which these 
athletes purchase higher education services and sell their athletic services, which violates federal 
antitrust law. Circuit court rulings conflict regarding whether student-athlete eligibility rules are 
commercial restraints subject to the Sherman Act, and lower courts have inconsistently 
interpreted and applied NCAA v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the Supreme 
Court’s only intercollegiate athletics antitrust law precedent. The Supreme Court’s refusal to 
resolve this conflict continues the significant judicial confusion regarding how antitrust law 
constrains the NCAA’s governance of intercollegiate athletics, which has evolved into a multi-
billion dollar part of the entertainment industry with millions of fans and more than 450,000 
student-athletes. Its decision not to do also creates uncertainty regarding how lower courts will 
resolve pending antitrust challenges to other NCAA amateurism rules and input market restraints 
such as limits on the duration and maximum number of athletic scholarships per sport as well as 
transfer rules. This article makes some recommendations for applying section 1 to NCAA 
student-athlete eligibility rules and input market restraints, which  will better promote consumer 
welfare, protect student-athletes’ economic rights, and permit the NCAA to promote the unique 
features of intercollegiate sports without unwarranted judicial micromanagement. 
Key words: O’Bannon v NCAA; amateurism rules; input market restraint; rule of reason; less 
restrictive alternative.  
Introduction 
O’Bannon v NCAA1 is the first federal appellate court decision holding that a National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) student-athlete eligibility rule unreasonably restrains 
trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.  More specifically, the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
NCAA amateurism rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving any revenue from 
* Professor of Law and Executive Director, National Sports Law Institute and LL.M. in Sports
Law Program for Foreign Lawyers, Marquette University Law School; President, Sports 
Lawyers Association. The views expressed herein are solely my own and are not those of any of 
these organizations.  The author expresses his gratitude to Jessica Goldstein for her excellent 
research and editorial assistance.  
1
 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
As published: Matthew J. Mitten, Why and How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided O'Bannon v. 
NCAA, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 62, Issue No. 1, pp.62-90, Copyright ©  2017, Reprinted by permission of 
SAGE Publications.  https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X17691383. 
2 
videogames and telecasts incorporating their names, images, or likenesses unreasonably restrain 
economic competition among its member universities in the college education market in which 
student-athletes purchase higher education services and sell their athletic services.  Both sides 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review O’Bannon, but the Supreme Court denied both 
petitions despite: 1) conflicting rulings among circuit courts regarding whether student-athlete 
eligibility rules are commercial restraints subject to the Sherman Act; 2) lower courts’ 
inconsistent interpretation and application of NCAA v Board of Regents of University of 
Oklahoma (Board of Regents),
2
 its only intercollegiate athletics antitrust law precedent; and 3)
pending section 1 litigation challenging other NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and input 
market restraints, which would benefit significantly from its guidance.   
In particular, there is sharp disagreement among federal appellate courts regarding 
whether student-athlete eligibility rules and their enforcement are valid as a matter of law, or 
whether they should be subject to rule of reason scrutiny. There also are differing judicial views 
concerning whether maintenance of NCAA-defined “amateurism” is appropriately characterized 
as a procompetitive justification. In addition, there is no principled and uniform jurisprudence 
applying section 1 to NCAA input market restraints that is consistent with generally accepted 
and sports industry-specific antitrust law principles.  
 In prior scholarship, I advocated that NCAA amateurism eligibility rules prohibiting 
price competition for student-athletes’ playing services constitute commercial restraints subject 
to section 1 rule of reason analysis rather than being judicially presumed to be valid.
3
  However,
I recognize that the principled application of section 1 to input market restraints such as NCAA 
student-athlete eligibility rules is a very complex, expensive, and time consuming endeavor and 
that using antitrust law to create free market economic competition for intercollegiate athletes’ 
services may conflict with the achievement of legitimate social welfare objectives in higher 
education. Thus, in subsequent scholarship, my co-authors and I argued in favor of alternative 
intercollegiate athletics regulatory systems along with Congressional antitrust immunity if 
certain conditions to achieve these objectives are satisfied, which continues to be my preferred 
approach.
4
  Given the uncertainty of future Congressional adoption of either proposal, this article
asserts that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in O’Bannon and suggests how it 
2
 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
3
 Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” College 
Athletics: The Need to Shift From Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of Amateurism to the 
Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1 (2000); Matthew J. Mitten, 
University Price Competition for Elite Students and Athletes: Illusions and Realities, 36 SO. TEX.
L. REV. 59 (1995) [hereinafter Mitten, University Price Competition].  
4
 Matthew J. Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the 
Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 ORE. L. REV. 
837 (2014); Matthew J. Mitten, James L. Musselman & Bruce W. Burton, Targeted Reform of 
Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779 (2010). 
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should have decided this case, thereby clarifying the appropriate application of section 1 to 
intercollegiate athletics input market restraints as well as providing guidance regarding its 
application to professional sports and potentially other joint ventures. 
This article begins by briefly comparing the key characteristics of NCAA intercollegiate 
athletics (particularly Division I FBS football and men’s basketball) to major league professional 
team sports. It then summarizes judicial application of section 1 to professional sports league 
labor market restraints, which is followed by a corresponding discussion of its application by 
courts to NCAA input market restraints, primarily those affecting student-athletes, including the 
NCAA amateurism rule at issue in O’Bannon. Next, it summarizes the parties’ respective 
petitions for a writ of certiorari and supporting amicus briefs, which identify several important 
antitrust issues requiring Supreme Court resolution.  It concludes by making some 
recommendations for judicial application of section 1 to NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules 
and other input market restraints, which is consistent with Board of Regents as well as Supreme 
Court and lower court precedent applying antitrust law to professional sports leagues. Judicial 
adoption of these recommendations would promote consumer welfare by maintaining the unique 
features of college sports that distinguish them from professional sports, while also prohibiting 
predominantly anticompetitive NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and other input market 
restraints without inappropriate judicial micromanagement of intercollegiate athletics. 
I. Similarities and Differences between NCAA Sports and Professional Team Sports  
NCAA intercollegiate athletics and North American major league professional team 
sports both are entertainment products consisting of athletic competitions with uncertain 
outcomesrequiring some degree of competitive balance among teams playing the gamethat 
have substantial commercial value because of their consumer popularity.  The NCAA and North 
American major league professional leagues produce many of the same sports (e.g., baseball, 
basketball, football, hockey, soccer), which are played pursuant to essentially the same on-field 
rules.  Like the NFL and NBA,
5
 Division I FBS football and men’s basketball annually generate 
multi-billion dollar revenues from live fan attendance, the sale of broadcasting rights, sponsors, 
and other sources.
6
   
                                                          
5
 For the 2014–2015 season, Forbes estimated that the NBA earned $5.2 billion in revenue.  
Forbes Releases 18th Annual NBA Team Valuations, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbespr/2016/01/20/forbes-releases-18th-annual-nba-team-
valuations/#529f71e76e3e.  Forbes also estimated that the NFL earned over $13.3 billion in 
revenue for the 2015–2016 season,.  Jason Belzer, Thanks to Roger Goodell, NFL Revenues 
Projected to Surpass $13 Billion in 2016, FORBES (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2016/02/29/thanks-to-roger-goodell-nfl-revenues-
projected-to-surpass-13-billion-in-2016/#12e2f44f3278. 
6
 In 2014, which was the first year of the College Football Playoff, bowl game revenues 
generated by Division I FBS conferences and schools exceeded $500 million.  In 2016, the 
NCAA extended its television contract, with both CBS and Turner Sports, through 2032 for its 
4 
 
Professional sports leagues generally are comprised of privately owned, for-profit 
member clubs that have the right to operate a team in a particular geographical location. 
Professional team sport athletes are employees of their respective clubs, andthey have the right to 
unionize under federal labor law.
7
  Major league professional players generally have done so, 
and their respective labor unions (e.g., NFL Players Association, NBA Players Association) 
collectively bargain the “wages, hours, and other working conditions” for all league players in 
accordance with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
8
 
By comparison, the highest level of intercollegiate athletics are produced by nonprofit 
institutions of higher education and regulated by the NCAA,
9
 an association of more than 1,100 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Division I men’s basketball tournament, and will receive more than $1 billion annually 
beginning in 2024.  The Big Ten’s new media rights deals with Fox and ESPN will generate 
$2.64 billion over the next six years; and Michigan, Ohio State, and UCLA signed apparel 
contracts collectively worth more than $700 million. Glenn Wong, Accelerating the Pace of 
Change for Division I Athletic Directors, SPORTS BUS. J., Nov. 28–Dec. 4, 2016, at 30.  
According to the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, annual intercollegiate sports 
revenue generated by the Division I Power Five Conferences, which consists of the 65 member 
universities of the Atlantic Coast Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big Twelve Conference, Pac 
Twelve Conference, and Southeastern Conference, will be $2.8 billion by 2020. Jake New, 
College Sports’ Slow Pace of Change, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/12/07/over-three-decades-pushing-sports-reform-
knight-commission-touts-small-
significant?utm_source=Inside+Higher+Ed&utm_campaign=101f9b37a9-
DNU20161207&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1fcbc04421-101f9b37a9-
197510237&mc_cid=101f9b37a9&mc_eid=bb78605517.  Total fan attendance has slowing 
become the area of college sports that draws the least amount of revenue.  For example, in 2013, 
the NCAA earned a total of $797 million in revenue, with $702 million coming from TV 
contracts, $71.71 million coming from ticket sales to the Division I men’s basketball tournament, 
and the rest presumably coming from attendance at the Division I women’s basketball 
tournament and e at other, men’s and women’s NCAA championship competitions.  College 
Sports (NCAA)Statistics & Facts, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/topics/1436/college-
sports-ncaa/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2016). 
7
 Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs & Ass’n of Nat’l Baseball League Umpires, 180 N.L.R.B. 
190 (1969) (National Labor Relations Board recognition that employees of professional sports 
leagues (and by implication their member clubs) have right to unionize under federal labor law).  
8
 29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq.  
9
 The NCAA, originally named the Intercollegiate Athletic Association, was founded in 1905 to 
change college football rules to make the sport safer in response to President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s threat to ban it after several college players died while playing football. Rodney K. 
5 
 
member colleges and universities organized into three divisions. The NCAA also organizes and 
sponsors annual championships for all its recognized sports except Division I FBS 
footballwhich selects its national champion pursuant to the College Football Playoff system, 
an agreement among its ten member conferences and independent individual universities.  
Although very few athletic departments annually generate revenues exceeding their costs,
10
 “in 
an extremely competitive higher education market, academic leaders use intercollegiate athletics 
as a catalyst and means” to achieve broader university objectives, which include attracting well 
qualified students who are fans of or participants in the university’s athletic teams; recruiting and 
retaining high quality faculty members; increasing fund raising; and enhancing support for the 
institution from a variety of constituencies.
11
  
The NCAA's objective is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the 
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, 
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”12  
According to the NCAA, “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and 
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and 
social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and 
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial 
enterprises.”13  In other words, the NCAA seeks to preserve the amateur nature of college sports 
as a component of higher education and to ensure competitive balance on the playing field.
14
 
This idealized NCAA philosophy has been characterized as the “amateur/education 
model” of intercollegiate athletics.15  Although college sports have been commercialized since 
their inception in the 1850s,
16
 it aptly describes Division III intercollegiate 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 10–13 (2000). 
10
 The most recent report published by the NCAA indicates that only 24 Division I university 
athletic departments generated positive net revenues in 2014.  2004–14 NCAA REVENUES & 
EXPENSES DIVISION I REPORT 28 (2015). 
11
 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 4, at 792.  
12
 2016–17 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 1.3.1 (2016) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].    
13
 Id. art. 2.9.  
14
 It also establishes requirements and guidelines to protect participating student-athletes’ health 
and safety. See, e.g., 2014–15 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK (2015), 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/MD15.pdf. 
15
 Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25 
RUTGERS L.J. 269, 270 (1994).  
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athleticsparticipating college athletes are not permitted to receive athletic scholarshipsas 
well as Division I and II women’s and men’s sports that do not generate net revenues.   
There is a contractual relationship between intercollegiate athletes and their respective 
universities
17
 into which NCAA academic, amateurism, and other eligibility rules are 
incorporated.  All athletes must be full-time students who meet minimum initial academic 
eligibility and progress towards degree requirements; they also have a maximum duration of 
intercollegiate athletics eligibility (generally 4-5 years).
18
  Division I and II intercollegiate 
athletes are permitted to receive full or partial athletic scholarships, but NCAA “amateurism 
rules” cap the scholarship’s value and restrict the economic benefits the athletes may receive 
from their respective universities, or third parties, for their playing services.
19
 The rules also 
prohibit athletes from receiving any payments for college athletics accomplishments or fame.
20
 
Because these sports generate multi-billion dollars revenues, Division I FBS football and 
men’s basketball are based on a “commercial/education model”21 of intercollegiate sports. 
However, commercialized college sports are “not subject to the same economic forces as purely 
commercial enterprises like professional sports” for the following reasons: 
. . . . [A]thletic directors seek to maximize the commercial return on big-time 
sports, [but] nonprofit universities do not distribute the profits generated by 
commercially successful football and men’s basketball programs to shareholders. 
Indeed, athletic directors are typically motivated to spend surplus revenues from 
football and men’s basketball programs on socially worthy causes, which often 
include a broad range of intercollegiate sports for elite athletes that do not 
generate sufficient revenues to pay for their costs, and occasionally subsidies for 
university academic and educational programs.
22
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16
 Mitten & Ross, supra note 4, at 840 (observing that “[t]he first intercollegiate athletic 
competition, a rowing competition between Harvard and Yale in 1852, was sponsored by a 
railroad seeking to attract passengers via its new route to the lake on which this event took 
place.”).   
17
 See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. App. 1972).  
18
 See generally MATTHEW J. MITTEN, ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 123–27 (3d ed. 2013).  
19
 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 12, art. 16.11.2 
20
 Id. art. 12.1.2.1.5. 
21
 Davis, supra note 15, at 279.  
22
 Mitten & Ross, supra note 4, at 841–42.  
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Similar to NFL and NBA coaches,
23
 several Division I FBS football and men’s basketball 
head coaches for these college sports earn multi-million dollar annual salaries,
24
 Twelve Division 
I FBS assistant football coaches make at least $1 million.
25
  Although 2013–14 average annual 
NFL and NBA player salaries were $2 million and $4.9 million,
26
 respectively, reflecting their 
substantial economic value to their teams, the NCAA’s amateurism rules prohibit all 
intercollegiate athletes, including Division I FBS football and men’s basketball players, who also 
have substantial economic value to their universities,
27
 from being paid any cash compensation 
for their playing services. The only (and maximum) direct economic benefit they are permitted to 
                                                          
23
 During the 2015–16 NBA season, Gregg Popovich, head coach of the San Antonio Spurs, 
earned $11 million, making him the highest paid NBA coach. Top 10 Highest Paid NBA 
Coaches in 2015–16, SPORTIGE (Jan. 14, 2016), http://sportige.com/top-10-highest-paid-nba-
coaches-90570/. For the 2016 season, Sean Payton, head coach of the New Orleans Saints, will 
earn $8 million, making him the highest paid NFL coach. Nat Berman, Top 10 NFL Coaching 
Salaries for the 2016 Season, MONEY INC (Aug. 9, 2016), http://moneyinc.com/nfl-coaching-
salaries-for-the-2016-season/.  
24
 In 2016, the top 25 highest-paid men’s college basketball coaches all made more than $2.2 
million, with the top  three earning $6.4 million (John Calipari, Kentucky), $6.03 million (Mike 
Krzyzewski, Duke), and $6 million (Rick Pitino, Louisville) million. Top 25 Highest-Paid 
College Basketball Coaches, SPORTING NEWS (Apr. 6, 2016), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-basketball/photos/highest-paid-richest-college-basketball-
hoops-coaches-calipari-coach-k/2oij4dpoac5y1a82xm2pk2mb6/slide/429806.  The top 10 
highest-paid football coaches made more than $4.4 million each, with the top  three earning 
$7.09 million (Nick Saban, Alabama), $7.004 million (Jim Harbaugh, Michigan), and $5.86 
million (Urban Meyer, Ohio State). The Highest-Paid College Football Coaches in 2016, AOL 
(Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.aol.com/article/2016/08/25/who-are-the-highest-paid-college-
football-coaches-in-2016/21458856/#slide=4027352#fullscreen. 
25
 Steve Berkowitz & Christopher Schnaars, $1M Club Grows in College Football, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 8, 2016, at 1A. 
26
 Kurt Badenhausen, Average MLB Player Salary Nearly Doubles NFL’s, but Still Trails NBA’s, 
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2015/01/23/average-mlb-
salary-nearly-double-nfls-but-trails-nba-players/#3f1f1ac0269e. 
27
 It is estimated that the average Division I FBS football is worth $163,869 per year. Cork 
Gaines, The Average University of Texas Football Player is Now Worth More Than $670,000 
Per Year, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/college-football-player-
value-2016-10. 
8 
 
receive is the value of a full cost-of-attendance athletic scholarship at their respective 
universities.
28
     
Although a full cost of attendance athletics scholarship has a substantial economic value
29
 
and is at least arguably “pay” in the form of in kind higher educational benefits for college sports 
playing services, courts have refused to characterize student-athletes as “employees” for 
purposes of state worker’s compensation laws.30  In Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of 
Trustees, the Indiana Supreme Court observed that “scholarship recipients are considered to be 
students seeking advanced educational opportunities and are not considered to be professional 
athletes.”31 Courts also have ruled that student-athletes are not employees under the federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act because “the long tradition of amateurism in college sports, by definition, 
shows that student athleteslike all other amateur athletesparticipate in their sports for 
reasons wholly unrelated to immediate compensation . . . and have done so for over 100 years 
under the NCAAwithout any real expectation of earning an income.”32 
In Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) determined that, even if Northwestern University scholarship football 
                                                          
28
 At the 2015 NCAA Annual Convention, the Power Five Conferences exercised their autonomy 
authority by voting to permit their members to offer full athletic scholarships equal in value to 
the full cost-of-attendance at their respective universities. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy 
Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholarships, NCAA.ORG (Jan. 18, 2015), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/autonomy-schools-adopt-cost-attendance-
scholarships.  Beginning with the 2015–2016 academic year, this legislation enables universities 
to provide athletic scholarships that include “[s]tipends, determined by institutions under 
federally created guidelines.” Mitch Sherman, Full Cost of Attendance Passes 79-1, ESPN (Jan. 
18, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/12185230/power-5-conferences-pass-
cost-attendance-measure-ncaa-autonomy-begins.  
29
 For example, its estimated annual value is $68,095 for student-athletes at Northwestern 
University, and $34,752 for an in-state student-athlete at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, a public university.  Christopher Smith, Full Cost of Attendance: What Will it Mean for 
Power Five Players?, SATURDAY DOWN S. (Apr. 10, 2015), 
http://www.saturdaydownsouth.com/sec-football/full-cost-of-attendance-explained/. 
30
 See, e.g., Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983); Waldrep v. 
Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 
N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).  
31
 Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1174. 
32
 Berger v NCAA, 2016 WL 7051905, at *5 (7th Cir. 2016). 
9 
 
players are employees under the NLRA, “it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert 
jurisdiction.”33  The Board stated: 
[o]ur decision is primarily premised on a finding that, because of the nature of 
sports leagues (namely the control exercised by the leagues over the individual 
teams) and the composition and structure of [Division I] FBS football (in which 
the overwhelming majority of competitors are public colleges and universities 
over which the Board cannot assert jurisdiction), it would not promote stability in 
labor relations to assert jurisdiction in this case.
34
  
Observing that “this case involves novel and unique circumstances,”35 the NLRB 
explained: 
[S]cholarship players are unlike athletes in undisputedly professional leagues, 
given that [they] are required, inter alia, to be enrolled full time as students and 
meet various academic requirements, and they are prohibited by NCAA 
regulations from engaging in many of the types of activities that professional 
athletes are free to engage in, such as profiting from the use of their names or 
likenesses. . . . [E]ven if scholarship players were regarded as analogous to 
players for professional sports teams who are considered employees for purposes 
of collective bargaining, such bargaining has never involved a bargaining unit 
consisting of a single team’s players, where the players for competing teams were 
unrepresented or entirely outside the Board’s jurisdiction.  
. . . As in professional sports . . . uniform rules of competition and compliance 
with them ensure the uniformity and integrity of individual games, and thus 
league competition as a whole. There is thus a symbiotic relationship among the 
various teams, the conferences, and the NCAA. As a result, labor issues directly 
involving only an individual team and its players would also affect the NCAA, the 
Big Ten, and the other member institutions. Many terms applied to one team 
therefore would likely have ramifications for other teams. . . . [S]uch an 
arrangement is seemingly unprecedented; all previous Board cases concerning 
professional sports involve leaguewide bargaining units.
36
 
                                                          
33
 N. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 2015 WL 4882656, at *1 
(Aug. 17, 2015). 
34
 Id. at *3. 
35
 Id. at *4.  
36
 Id. at *4–5. 
10 
 
Some states have laws that effectively prohibit intercollegiate athletes at public 
universities from unionizing under state labor laws applicable to public employees.
37
  As a result 
of Northwestern University and these state laws, intercollegiate athletes currently do not have the 
legal right to unionize and collectively bargain any of the terms of their contracts with NCAA 
universities, which effectively would immunize any agreed terms from antitrust challenge 
pursuant to the nonstatutory labor exemption.   
II. Judicial Application of Section 1 to Professional Sports League Labor Market Restraints  
Professional sports league clubs’ collectively imposed labor market restraints on players, 
such as fixing their compensation, rules determining their eligibility to play in the league, or 
preventing their ability to choose their teams, are input market restraints that are subject to and 
may violate section 1 under well-established precedent.  In Mandeville Island Farms v. American 
Crystal Sugar Co.,
38
 the Supreme Court held that an agreement among California sugar refiners 
who sell sugar in interstate commerce to pay a uniform price for sugar beets grown in California 
states a claim under section 1. “It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination 
condemned by the Act, even though the price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially 
injured under the treble damage claim are sellers, not customers or consumers.”39 It reasoned that 
the Sherman Act “is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made 
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated”40 because “[t]he policy 
of the Act is competition,” which “cannot be flouted”41 by concerted price fixing by group of 
buyers. 
Although Mandeville Island Farms held that fixing the price of inputs necessary to 
produce a product is per se illegal, courts generally analyze the legality of restraints that fixed 
the price of professional athletes’ wages under the rule of reason.  In Brown v. Pro Football, 
Inc.,
42
 a Washington, D.C. federal district court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that an agreement 
among NFL clubs “to pay all Developmental Squad players a flat sum of $1,000 per week, 
regardless of any individual player's background, skill, or potential, is a per se violation of the 
                                                          
37
 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.56 (West 2016) (“Notwithstanding any provision of 
the Revised Code to the contrary, a student attending a state university as defined in section 
3345.011 of the Revised Code is not an employee of the state university based upon the student's 
participation in an athletic program offered by the state university.”). See also MICH. COMP.  
LAWS § 423.201(1)(e)(iii) (2016). 
38
 334 U.S. 219 (1948).  
39
 Id. at 235. 
40
 Id. at 236. 
41
 Id. at 243. 
42
 1992 WL 88039 (D.D.C. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1041(D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 
518 U.S. 231 (1996).  
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Sherman Act.”43 The court analyzed it under the rule of reason because the clubs are engaged in 
a joint venture to produce an entertainment product (i.e., on-field competition among 
professional football teams), which cannot be produced by a single club and necessarily requires 
their cooperation, and they offered legitimate procompetitive justifications for this restraint. 
Applying the rule of reason, the court initially determined that this restraint has the significant 
anticompetitive effect of precluding all Developmental Squad players from negotiating their 
salary with any NFL clubs.  It explained that if the restraint “has legitimate business purposes 
which would promote competition, the court must then balance [its] ‘anticompetitive evils’ . . .  
against its ‘procompetitive virtues.’”44  It found that the clubs did not prove this salary restraint 
“enhances competition in the labor market for professional football players”45 or promotes on-
field competitive balance among them.  Because the clubs failed to establish it is necessary to 
achieve either procompetitive objective, the court held that its significant anticompetitive effects 
rendered it unlawful under the rule of reason.  It granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment because the undisputed facts established that the salary restraint has clear net 
anticompetitive effects, thereby obviating the need for any fact finding and balancing by a jury or 
the court.   
Courts generally have held that unilaterally determined league ruleswhich are the 
product of an agreement among its clubs that are competitors for players’ 
services
46establishing player eligibility requirements,47 a draft for entry level players,48 and 
restrictions on the ability of veteran players to choose a new team after their current contracts 
expire
49
 also violate the rule of reason.
50
  For example, in Smith v. Pro Football (which Brown 
relied on), the District of Columbia Circuit explained: 
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 Id. at *6.  
44
 Id. at *9.  
45
 Id. at *9.  
46
 See, e.g., McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992). 
47
 Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d on other grounds, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 
2004).  Some early cases such as Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 
1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), held that such restraints are per se illegal, but these cases subsequently 
have been effectively overruled by American Needle and Board of Regents, which require 
application of the rule of reason to most sports industry restraints. See infra notes 55-56, 67 and 
accompanying text.   
48
 Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
49
 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); McNeil v NFL, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn. 
1992).  
50
 Fraser v. Major League Soccer LLC, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 885 (2002), 
is one of the few cases in which a major professional sports league labor market restraint was 
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a player draft can survive scrutiny under the rule of reason only if it is 
demonstrated to have positive, economically procompetitive benefits that offset 
its anticompetitive effects, or, at the least, if it is demonstrated to accomplish 
legitimate business purposes and to have a net anticompetitive effect that is 
insubstantial.
51
  
It upheld the district court’s bench trial verdict that the then-existing 16-round NFL player draft 
is an unreasonable restraint of trade: 
The draft is anticompetitive in its effect on the market for players’ services, 
because it virtually eliminates economic competition among buyers for the 
services of sellers. The draft is allegedly “procompetitive” in its effect on the 
playing field; but the NFL teams are not economic competitors on the playing 
field, and the draft, while it may heighten athletic competition and thus improve 
the entertainment product offered to the public, does not increase competition in 
the economic sense of encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the 
product at lower cost. Because the draft’s “anticompetitive” and “procompetitive” 
effects are not comparable, it is impossible to “net them out” in the usual rule-of-
reason balancing. The draft’s “anticompetitive evils,” in other words, cannot be 
balanced against its “procompetitive virtues,” and the draft be upheld if the latter 
outweigh the former. In strict economic terms, the draft’s demonstrated 
procompetitive effects are nil.52 
Smith also held that an anticompetitive labor market restraint will be invalidated if 
“significantly less anticompetitive alternatives” exist to achieve the league’s procompetitive 
objective of achieving competitive balance among its clubs.
53
 For example, permitting multiple 
clubs to draft a player, a draft with fewer rounds “applying only to the most talented players and 
enabling their ‘average’ brethren to negotiate in a ‘free market,’” or to replace the draft with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
found not to violate antitrust law. Plaintiffs, a group of professional soccer players, failed to 
prove that the challenged restraints imposed by Major League Soccer, a U.S. league, have 
significant anticompetitive effects because there is an international market for the services of 
professional soccer players “to which players can turn, as a practical matter, for alternate 
opportunities for employment.” Id. at 63.     
51
 Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188. 
52
 Id. at 1186. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 409 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d on other grounds, 
369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the NFL cannot justify rule that “limits competition in 
the player personnel market but enhances competition in the market for sports entertainment” 
because the later is “a different market”).  
53
 Smith, 593 F.2d at 1187. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410 (“The antitrust laws do not 
tolerate a policy that restrains trade—even if there is some procompetitive benefit—when a 
policy that results in less prejudice to competition would be equally effective.”).   
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“revenue-sharing to equalize the teams' financial resources [as] a method of preserving 
‘competitive balance.’”54 
Smith’s holding that the anticompetitive effects of a labor market restraint cannot be 
justified by procompetitive effects that enhance a sports league’s ability to compete in the 
entertainment market, an output market different from the restrained input market, has been 
effectively overruled.  In American Needle, Inc. v. NFL,
55
 the Supreme Court subsequently 
recognized that a professional sports league’s interest in maintaining competitive balance among 
its member clubs is “legitimate and important,” which is “unquestionably an interest that may 
well justify a variety of collective decisions made by the teams” under the rule of reason. 
American Needle strongly suggests that a sports league can justify a labor market restraint 
reasonably necessary to promote competitive balance among its member clubs.
56
  
Because North American major professional league players have chosen to unionize and 
courts have construed the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption very broadly, there have 
been very few antitrust suits challenging professional sports labor market restraints for the past 
25 years. This exemption precludes the parties (i.e. league, clubs, union, and players) from 
challenging the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) on antitrust grounds, which 
furthers the strong federal labor policy permitting employees, including professional athletes, to 
unionize and collectively bargain their wages and working conditions.
57
  In a series of cases from 
1976–1987, federal appellate courts held that CBA terms are not subject to antitrust challenge, 
thereby permitting league clubs and the players union to agree to contract terms that otherwise 
may violate antitrust law.
58
  
In Wood v. NBA, the Second Circuit explained:  
                                                          
54
 Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188. 
55
 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010). 
56
 See generally id. This view is consistent with Supreme Court antitrust precedent not involving 
the sports industry recognizing that a reduction in intrabrand economic competition among 
sellers of the same branded product may have the procompetitive effect of preserving or 
enhancing interbrand economic competition among sellers of competing products. See Cont’l 
T.V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  See also Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 
1111–113 (1st Cir. 1994) (procompetitive effects in a closely related market (i.e., those that 
enhance a professional sports league’s ability to more effectively compete with other forms of 
entertainment) should be balanced against a restraint’s anticompetitive effects). 
57
 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers, Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).   
58
 See, e.g., Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 
1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).  
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Freedom of contract is an important cornerstone of national labor 
policy . . . . Courts cannot hope to fashion contract terms more efficient than those 
arrived at by the parties who are to be governed by them. . . .   
[It] is particularly important in the context of collective bargaining between 
professional athletes and their leagues. Such bargaining relationships raise 
numerous problems with little or no precedent in standard industrial relations. As 
a result, leagues and player unions may reach seemingly unfamiliar or strange 
agreements. If courts were to intrude and to outlaw such solutions, leagues and 
their player unions would have to arrange their affairs in a less efficient way.
59
 
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,
60
 the Supreme Court held that the nonstatutory labor 
exemption immunizes all restraints on the labor market for players’ services (e.g., player drafts, 
team or individual player salary caps, and player free agency restrictions) from antitrust 
challengeas long as there is an ongoing collective bargaining process between the league and 
the players union.  If there is, federal labor law exclusively governs labor relations between the 
parties.  
III. Judicial Application of Section 1 to NCAA Input Market Restraints Affecting College 
Athletes 
Prior to NCAA v. Board of Regents,
61
 the Supreme Court’s 1984 landmark decision 
regarding the application of antitrust law to NCAA governance of intercollegiate athletics, lower 
courts consistently rejected antitrust challenges to NCAA rules creating input market restrictions 
affecting coaches and student-athletes.  In Hennessey v. NCAA,
62
 the Fifth Circuit ruled that, 
although the NCAA has no blanket antitrust immunity merely because it is a nonprofit joint 
venture of institutions of higher education, limiting the number of coaches for particular 
intercollegiate sports is not an unreasonable restraint of trade.  Some courts held that NCAA 
student-athlete eligibility rules to promote amateurism in college sports and/or to protect its 
members’ academic standards are noncommercial restraints that “[d]o not come within the 
purview of the Sherman Act.”63  Others concluded, without any supporting evidence, that such 
rules and their enforcement are a reasonable means of achieving these objectives and promoting 
fair competition in intercollegiate athletics.
64
     
                                                          
59
 Wood, 809 F.2d at 961.  
60
 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
61
 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  
62
 Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).  
63
 Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 998, at *4 (D.N.J.), 
aff’d, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974).  See Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).  
64
 See, e.g., Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz.1983).  
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In Board of Regents, the Court confirmed that the NCAA is subject to antitrust law 
because its regulatory activities affect interstate commerce.  It noted that the “NCAA is an 
association of schools which compete against each other to attract television revenues, not to 
mention fans and athletes;”65 thereby recognizing that its rules and decisions are the product of 
an agreement among its members that satisfies section 1’s concerted action requirement. 
Although it affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s holding that the NCAA’s exclusive sale of college 
football television broadcasting rights violates section 1, it reversed its determination that it is 
per se illegal horizontal price fixing and output limitation.  Because intercollegiate athletics is 
“an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product[athletic 
competition among NCAA universities]is to be available at all,”66 the Court held that the rule 
of reason applies in analyzing this restraint’s “impact on competitive conditions.”67  
Because it limits the total number of televised college football games below the output in 
a free market (and fixes the price of broadcast rights), the NCAA’s television plan has clear 
anticompetitive effects and harms consumer welfare.  Thus, the NCAA has “a heavy burden of 
establishing an affirmative defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the 
operations of a free market.”68 The Court recognized maintenance of brand differentiation and 
competitive balance as two procompetitive justifications for NCAA restraints with 
anticompetitive effects.  It stated: “the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—
college football” and “[t]he identification of this ‘product’ with an academic tradition 
differentiates [it] from . . . professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable.”69 It 
explained that “the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and 
diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman 
Act.”70 Because the NCAA football television plan was not necessary to further either of these 
procompetitive objectives, the Court held that it violated the rule of reason.   
In dicta, the Court stated: “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product’ 
[college sports], athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”71 It 
observed: “The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of 
amateurism in college sports. There can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to play 
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 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99.  
66
 Id. at 101.  
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 Id. at 103.  
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 Id. at 113.  
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 Id. at 101.  
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 Id. at 120.  
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 Id. at 101.  
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that role.”72  It also agreed with the NCAA’s contention that “maintaining competitive balance 
among amateur athletic teams is legitimate and important.”73 
Although it was not necessary to consider any less restrictive alternatives to support its 
conclusion that the NCAA football television plan was an unreasonable restraint because it was 
“not even arguably tailored to serve” competitive balance among NCAA schools, the Court 
noted several other NCAA restrictions “better tailored” and “clearly sufficient” to achieve this 
objective.
74
  
After Board of Regents, federal appellate courts generally continued to rule that NCAA 
student-athlete eligibility rules and their enforcement by disciplinary sanctions are valid as a 
matter of law because they are 1) noncommercial restraints not subject to antitrust scrutiny; or 2) 
commercial restraints that are a presumptively reasonable means of promoting brand 
differentiation, competitive balance, or amateurism in intercollegiate athletics.  
In Banks v. NCAA,
75
 the Seventh Circuit held that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no agent” 
rules, which resulted in a Notre Dame student-athlete’s loss of eligibility to play college football 
when he entered the NFL draft and agreed to be represented by an agent in that sport, is not a 
commercial restraint that causes antitrust injury.  It reasoned that “[n]one of the NCAA rules 
affecting college football eligibility restrain trade in the market for college players because the 
NCAA does not exist as a minor league training ground for future NFL players but rather to 
provide an opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a collegiate 
education.”76  Similarly, in Smith v. NCAA,77 the Third Circuit dismissed an allegation that the 
NCAA’s postbaccalaureate bylaw, which precluded a graduate student from participating in 
intercollegiate athletics at a university other than the one at which she earned her undergraduate 
degree, violates section 1. The court concluded that “eligibility rules are not related to the 
NCAA’s commercial or business activities;” therefore, “the Sherman Act does not apply.”78  
Relying on Smith, the Sixth Circuit, in Bassett v. NCAA,
79
 held that the “NCAA’s rules on 
recruiting student athletes, specifically those rules prohibiting improper inducements and 
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 Id. at 119. 
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 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 908 (1992).  
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academic fraud, are all explicitly non-commercial.”80 The court affirmed the dismissal of a 
section 1 claim by a former college football coach who had been disciplined for violating them. 
In McCormick v. NCAA,
81
 the Fifth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that NCAA 
student-athlete amateurism eligibility rules are commercial restraints subject to rule of reason 
scrutiny. Relying on Board of Regents, it dismissed an allegation that these rules constitute price-
fixing in violation of section 1. In upholding their validity as a matter of law, the court explained:   
The essential inquiry under the rule-of-reason analysis is whether the challenged 
restraint enhances competition. Applying this test, we have little difficulty in 
concluding that the challenged restrictions are reasonable. The Supreme Court 
indicated strongly in Board of Regents [by stating] . . . ‘In order to preserve the 
character and quality of the “product,” athletes must not be paid, must be 
required to attend class, and the like.’ . . . The NCAA markets college football as 
a product distinct from professional football. The eligibility rules create the 
product and allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures. The goal 
of the NCAA is to integrate athletics with academics. Its requirements reasonably 
further this goal. 
. . . We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts that 
would carry their antitrust claim and that the motion to dismiss was properly 
granted.
82
  
In Agnew v. NCAA,
83
 the Seventh Circuit diverged from (or at least clarified) Banks by 
expressing “the view that the Sherman Act applies to the NCAA bylaws generally” 84 because 
despite their nonprofit status, NCAA universities enter into commercial transactions with 
premier athletes by providing scholarships for their playing services that can generate millions of 
dollars in revenues.  Thus, all NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and other input market 
restrictions are commercial restraints.  According to the court and consistent with McCormick, 
“[m]ost—if not all—eligibility rules . . . fall comfortably within the presumption of 
procompetitiveness afforded to certain NCAA regulations”85 despite being commercial restraints.  
                                                          
80
 Id. at 433.  
81
 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988). 
82
 Id. at 1344–345 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)). See Smith, 139 
F.3d at 187 (“we think that the bylaw so clearly survives a rule of reason analysis that we do not 
hesitate upholding it by affirming [its dismissal] for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 
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 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).  
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Distinguishing between NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and other restraints such 
as a maximum number of allowable scholarships per sport and its then-existent one-year limit on 
the duration of athletic scholarships, the Seventh Circuit explained the rationale for presuming 
that eligibility rules are valid for purposes of antitrust law: 
The NCAA’s limitation on athlete compensation beyond educational 
expenses . . . directly advances the goal of maintaining a “clear line of 
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports,” and thus is 
best categorized as an eligibility rule aimed at preserving the existence of 
amateurism and the student-athlete. The Bylaws at issue in this case, on the other 
hand, are not directly related to the separation of amateur athletics from pay-for-
play athletics, as explained in the preceding paragraphs. Nor do they help preserve 
the existence of the student-athlete (as a facial matter, anyway), since they 
actually limit the number of athletes awarded financial aid and the amount of 
financial aid that an athlete can be awarded. Thus, financial aid rules do not 
always assist in the preservation of amateurism or the existence of student-
athletes, so the regulations at issue cannot be presumptively procompetitive 
simply because they relate to financial aid.
86
 
Two other pre-O’Bannon federal appellate court cases involving input price fixing 
agreements among universities are relevant regarding the antitrust validity of NCAA input 
market restraints affecting college athletes. In Law v. NCAA,
87
 the Tenth Circuit held that the 
NCAA’s Restricted Earnings Coach (REC) rule limiting the annual compensation of certain 
Division I entry-level coaches to $16,000 violated the “quick look” rule of reason because the 
NCAA did not prove it furthered a procompetitive justification.  Characterizing the REC rule as 
“a horizontal agreement to fix prices,”88 the court found it is not “necessary to produce 
competitive intercollegiate sports.”89  It concluded that the NCAA’s objectives of retaining 
entry-level coaching positions and cutting costs are not valid procompetitive justifications. 
In United States v. Brown University,
90
 the Antitrust Division alleged that an agreement 
among the members of the Ivy Overlap Group (the eight Ivy League universities and 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) to award financial aid only on the basis of need, to share 
financial information regarding admitted students, and to jointly develop and apply a uniform 
need analysis violated section 1.  The Third Circuit held that nonprofit educational institutions’ 
“determination of financial assistance to students is part and parcel of the process of setting 
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tuition and thus a commercial transaction” to which the Sherman Act applies.91  Because this 
restraint “eliminate[s] price competition for talented students,” it is facially anticompetitive and 
“cannot be justified solely on the basis of social welfare concerns”92 such as increasing the 
socioeconomic diversity of their student bodies.  The court concluded that the full rule of reason 
applied in determining its reasonableness because defendant MIT offered procompetitive 
justifications.  Citing Board of Regents, it recognized enhanced “consumer appeal of an Overlap 
education” and “consumer choice” (i.e., providing “students who otherwise would not have been 
able to afford an Overlap education the opportunity to have one”) as procompetitive 
justifications.
93
   
O’Bannon v. NCAA’s determination that agreements among universities to fix input 
market prices must be justified by a procompetitive objective under the rule of reason is 
consistent with Law and Brown University, although it diverges from circuit court precedent 
holding that NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules (including those that effectively fix prices) 
are valid as a matter of law.  In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit ruled that NCAA amateurism rules 
preventing current and former Division I basketball and FBS football players from receiving any 
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (“NIL compensation rules”) in 
videogames and televised games is a commercial restraint “within the ambit of the Sherman 
Act.”94  It distinguished Smith because the NCAA’s postbaccalaureate bylaw is “a true 
‘eligibility’ rule akin to” its academic eligibility rules and those limiting the number of seasons 
student-athletes can play intercollegiate sports.
95
  Characterizing Bassett’s holding that NCAA 
amateurism rules are noncommercial as “simply wrong,” the Ninth Circuit failed to understand 
its reasoning that “rules that seek to combat commercialism in college sports by preventing 
schools from competing to pay student-athletes cannot be considered restraints on 
‘commerce.’”96 The court disagreed with the NCAA’s assertion that its amateurism rules are 
valid as a matter of law under Board of Regents and found Agnew “unpersuasive” to the extent it 
supports this contention.
97
  It held that the “amateurism rules’ validity must be proved, not 
presumed.”98 
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To determine if the NCAA’s NIL compensation rules constitute an unreasonable restraint 
of trade, the Ninth Circuit applied the same three-step full rule of reason analysis as did the 
district court: 
[1] The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the restraint produces 
significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market. [2] If the plaintiff 
meets this burden, the defendant must come forward with evidence of the 
restraint’s procompetitive effects. [3] The plaintiff must then show that any 
legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.
99
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the following rulings by the district court: based on 
Mandeville Island Farms, the restraint fixes the price of one element of competition (i.e., NIL 
rights) at zero in the college education market in which NCAA universities compete for the 
services of student-athletes; NIL compensation rules serve “the two procompetitive 
purposes . . . [of] integrating academics with athletics, and ‘preserving the popularity of the 
NCAA’s product by promoting its current understanding of amateurism;’”100 these rules “do not 
promote competitive balance, . . . do not increase output in the college education market, 
and . . . play a limited role in integrating student-athletes with their schools’ academic 
communities.”101  Although it recognized that “a restraint that broadens choices can be 
procompetitive,”102 the court rejected the NCAA’s assertion that “denying student-athletes 
compensation apart from scholarships”103 does. It reasoned that “loosening or abandoning the 
compensation rules might be the best way to ‘widen’ recruits range of choices.”104  For example, 
“athletes might well be more likely to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that 
they were earning some amount of NIL income while they were in school.”105 
Regarding the less restrictive alternative prong of rule of reason analysis, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that “plaintiffs must make a strong evidentiary showing” that its proposed 
alternative is “viable” and “‘virtually as effective’ in serving the procompetitive purposes of the 
NCAA’s current rules, and without significant costs.”106  The court observed it “must generally 
afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend college athletics” and “‘plenty of room . . . to 
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preserve the amateur character of intercollegiate athletics.’”107 Applying this standard, the panel 
ruled that allowing NCAA schools to award full cost of attendance scholarships (which have 
been permissible since August 2015) is a substantially less restrictive alternative to the NCAA’s 
NIL compensation rules, which would be an effective means of integrating academics with 
athletics and maintaining amateurism in intercollegiate athletics without significantly increasing 
their costs.  It affirmed the district court’s injunction requiring the NCAA to allow its members 
to provide compensation up to the full cost of attending their respective institutions.  
The Ninth Circuit majority held that the district court erred in determining that permitting 
NCAA schools to provide pro rata cash payments to football and basketball players of no less 
than $5,000 for each year of sports participation after they left college or their eligibility expires 
is also a substantially less restrictive alternative to the NCAA’s current NIL compensation 
rules.
108
  The district court reasoned that no evidence established that “consumer demand for the 
NCAA’s product would decrease if schools were permitted to provide such stipends” or that 
doing so “would hinder any school’s efforts to educate its student-athletes or integrate them into 
the academic community.”109 They disagreed that “allowing students to be paid NIL 
compensation unrelated to their education expenses, is ‘virtually as effective’ in preserving 
amateurism as not allowing compensation” because not paying student-athletes is precisely what 
makes them amateurs.”110  In reaching this conclusion, they effectively ruled that antitrust law 
permits the NCAA to prohibit student-athletes from receiving “cash payments untethered to their 
education expenses.”111 
Acknowledging that his disagreement with the majority “largely boils down to a 
difference in opinion as the procompetitive interests at stake,” the dissenting judge characterized 
the key issue as “whether allowing student-athletes to be compensated for their NILs is ‘virtually 
as effective’ in preserving popular demand for college sports as not allowing compensation.”112 
He cited expert economist testimony that “consumer demand typically does not decrease when 
athletes are permitted to receive payment, and that this general principle holds true across a wide 
variety of sports and competitive formats.”113  In his view, this record evidence was sufficient to 
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affirm the district court’s finding that a $5,000 per year stipend is a substantially less restrictive 
alternative to achieve this objective.  
IV. Proposed Application of Section 1 to NCAA Input Market Restraints Affecting College 
Athletes 
O’Bannon generated petitions from both parties for a writ of certiorari expressing a wide 
variety of views regarding how antitrust law should be judicially applied to NCAA student-
athlete eligibility rules and input market restraints as well as its broader implications for the 
sports industry.  The NCAA asserted O’Bannon’s unprecedented ruling that its amateurism rules 
violate section 1 conflicts with Board of Regents’ holding that “a defining feature” of 
intercollegiate sports is that “participants must be amateur student-athletes,”114 which is 
procompetitive and should be upheld as a matter of lawas Agnew, Smith, and McCormick did. 
It also claimed that O’Bannon improperly applied a de facto least restrictive alternative standard 
that improperly second-guesses business decisions to achieve legitimate objectives 
“without . . . adding that much to competition.”115 In addition, the NCAA contended that 
O’Bannon encourages antitrust challenges to its rules, and that it “should not have to undergo a 
full trial (and years of litigation) or face treble damages whenever a plaintiff or counsel hits on a 
supposedly better way to administer college athletics.”116 
Three amicus briefs were filed in support of the NCAA’s petition. The Bar Association of the 
District of Columbia Antitrust Law Section expressed concern that O’Bannon exposes 
educational institutions to potentially broad antitrust liability for rules prohibiting or limiting 
student-athlete compensation or athletic scholarships for high school sports and nonrevenue 
generating intercollegiate sports.  It advocated that the Supreme Court adopt the following 
standard: “If the challenged restraint is reasonably necessary to create a new product, and if [it] 
is socially beneficial (for example, if [it] increases output or consumer choice), then the restraint 
likely increases consumer welfare, and is presumptively lawful under antitrust’s rule of 
reason.”117 The National Federation of State High School Associations claimed that O’Bannon’s 
“detailed and costly antitrust inquiry, one directed at the core function of defining ‘amateurism’ 
itself, promises to hinder the NCAA’s future efforts to halt the encroachment of professionalism, 
with negative consequences for amateur athletics in colleges, and beyond,” including 
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interscholastic athletics.
118
  A group of twelve antitrust scholars agreed that O’Bannon 
inappropriately applied a least restrictive alternative standard because “[o]nce the court found 
that restricting payments to students was reasonably necessary to the amateurism/integration 
justifications, it should not have condemned the restraints solely because it thought a different 
level of athlete compensation was preferable to the level chosen by the NCAA.”119 “While 
increasing allowable payments to students from full grant-in-aid to cost of attendance may be a 
fairer policy,” they asserted that it “is not a judgment the antitrust laws authorize courts to 
make.”120 
The plaintiff student-athletes claimed that the O’Bannon majority’s adoption of 
amateurism as a valid procompetitive interest in determining a proper remedy for the NCAA’s 
antitrust violation contravenes Board of Regents by “remov[ing] the critical question—the effect 
on consumers—from the analysis, making ‘amateurism’. . . an end in itself.”121 Their petition 
also asserted that the majority inappropriately used less restrictive alternative analysis to require 
plaintiffs to prove the district court’s remedy permitting them to receive deferred trust fund pro 
rata compensation of $5,000 per year of intercollegiate athletics participation was justified. In 
other words, this requirement “improperly would limit antitrust relief to injunctions that qualify 
as ‘less restrictive alternatives’ under the Rule of Reason.”122   
Federal appellate courts’ inconsistent application of section 1 to NCAA student-athlete 
eligibility rules and the foregoing very different views of the parties and amici regarding the 
important antitrust issues raised by O’Bannon illustrate the need for a principled framework for 
determining the legality of NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and other input market 
restraints.  The following recommendations provide a principled framework for applying section 
1 in a manner that promotes consumer welfare by permitting the NCAA to maintain the unique 
features of college sports distinguishing them from professional sports, while prohibiting 
predominantly anticompetitive NCAA rules without inappropriate judicial micromanagement of 
intercollegiate athletics.  They are consistent with Board of Regents as well as Supreme Court 
and lower court precedent applying antitrust law to professional sports leagues.  In addition, 
these recommendations would provide guidance to lower courts in resolving pending antitrust 
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litigation challenging the legality of other NCAA amateurism rules
123
 as well as other NCAA 
input market restraints such as a prohibition on multi-year athletic scholarships and cap on their 
maximum number
124
 and rules preventing Division I basketball and football players from 
transferring to other NCAA Division I schools without losing athletic eligibility for a year.
125
 
A. NCAA Student-Athlete Eligibility Rules and Input Market Restrictions Generally Are 
Commercial Restraints 
 As Board of Regents recognized, NCAA universities are competitors for student-athletes’ 
enrollment as students and their playing services as intercollegiate athletes.  In American Needle, 
the Supreme Court held that rules and agreements among separate economic entities in a joint 
venture such as a sports league are not immune from section 1 scrutiny merely because their 
cooperation is necessary to produce their product of sports competition.  O’Bannon and Agnew 
appropriately characterized an athletic scholarship, which is a contract between a university and 
its student-athletes, as a commercial transaction because it is the underlying basis of a 
relationship that has substantial economic value for both parties. This view is consistent with 
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Brown University’s determination that a university’s award of financial aid to students is a 
commercial transaction to which the Sherman Act is applicable.  
NCAA rules are incorporated into its member universities’ athletic scholarships, and 
student-athlete compliance with these rules is a condition of their eligibility to compete in 
intercollegiate athletics.  NCAA amateurism rules “restrict the compensation or things of value 
that student-athletes may receive or the ways by which they earn compensation”126 and prohibit  
any price competition among NCAA schools for student-athletes’ playing services. To maintain 
their eligibility to play intercollegiate athletics, NCAA amateurism rules also prohibit student-
athletes from receiving any economic benefits or preferential treatment (e.g., free or reduced 
price goods or services) based on their athletic achievements or fame from others.
127
 NCAA 
academic eligibility requirements have commercial effects by eliminating an element of non-
price competition among universities, which prevents athletes who do not satisfy them from 
receiving the economic benefits of free or reduced price higher education.  NCAA transfer rules 
have similar commercial effects by generally requiring a student-athlete who transfers from any 
member institution to another one to complete a full year of academic residence before being 
eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics, which may preclude the receipt of an athletic 
scholarship with corresponding adverse economic effects.
128
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Other NCAA input market restraints, such as prohibiting multi-year athletic scholarships 
or per sport caps on their number, eliminate economic competition among universities for 
student-athletes. Applying Agnew, in Rock v. NCAA, a federal district court ruled that NCAA 
limits on the maximum number of Division I football scholarships its member universities could 
award (eighty-five for Football Bowl Series (FBS) teams, and sixty-three for Football 
Championship Series (FCS) teams) and prohibitions against multi-year scholarships constitute 
commercial activity subject to section 1.
129
 
However, it would not be appropriate to characterize all NCAA input market regulation 
as commercial restraints subject to antitrust scrutiny.  In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the production of intercollegiate sports requires agreement among NCAA 
members regarding “[a] myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the field, the 
number of players on a team, and extent to which physical violence is to be encouraged or 
proscribed.”130  Although “all restrain the manner in which [NCAA] institutions compete,” it 
would not make sense to classify the rules of the game as commercial restraints.
131
 Based on 
Board of Regents and because of their de minis anticompetitive effects, NCAA rules and 
regulation to protect student-athlete health and safety (e.g., pre-participation or return to play 
medical clearance requirements; drug testing program and sanctions) also are not commercial 
restraints subject to section 1.
132
  
B. All NCAA Student-Athlete Eligibility Rules Are Subject to Rule of Reason Analysis Except 
Academic Eligibility Requirements, Which Should Be Valid As a Matter of Law 
For the same reasons that NCAA student-athlete eligibility rulesexcept player safety 
regulationsare commercial restraints, it is inappropriate to interpret Board of Regents as 
creating a presumption that all student-athlete eligibility rules, particularly amateurism rules that 
fix student-athletes’ compensation, are valid as a matter of law.  Board of Regents involved a 
section 1 challenge to an NCAA output market restraint, its exclusive college football television 
plan that eliminated competition among its member schools regarding the sale of rights to their 
football games.  It did not consider the antitrust validity of any NCAA student-athlete eligibility 
rules, much less hold that any of them are per se legal.  Rather, it held that a price fixing 
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agreement among NCAA member schools imposes “a heavy burden of establishing an 
affirmative defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the operations of a 
free market.”133 Consistent with American Needle and Law, O’Bannon held that a price fixing 
agreement among sports league or organization members is subject to rule of reason scrutiny. It 
properly rejected contrary holdings by Bassett and McCormack as well as Agnew’s broad view 
that “[m]ost—if not all—eligibility rules” are presumptively procompetitive.   
In contrast  to the NCAA’s rules fixing student-athletes’ compensation from its member 
schools and prohibiting their receipt of economic benefits from other sources, its academic 
eligibility requirements (e.g., initial eligibility and progress towards degree rules) define the core 
or essential characteristics of its unique brand of athletic competition among intercollegiate 
student-athletes.  In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court observed that “the NCAA seeks to 
market a particular brand of football—college football” and “the identification of this ‘product’ 
with an academic tradition differentiates [it]” from professional sports.134  It concluded that “the 
preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to 
intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.”135  In 
O’Bannon, although the challenged restraint was not an NCAA academic eligibility rule, both 
the Ninth Circuit and district court determined that “integrating academics and athletics” is a 
procompetitive justification.
136
 Accordingly, it is appropriate that NCAA academic eligibility 
requirements, although properly characterized as commercial restraints, be presumed to be 
procompetitive and valid as a matter of law without rule of reason analysis.
137
   
C. Judicial Application of the Rule of Reason Should Be Consistent With Antitrust Law 
Objectives 
A renowned antitrust law scholar describes the prevailing application of the rule of 
reason as follows: 
Today, the courts pursue rule of reason analysis through a verbal sequence 
something like this: first, the plaintiff has the burden to show a prima facie 
anticompetitive restraint, which requires proof of power and a threat of 
anticompetitive effects. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show some 
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justification for the restraint. If the defendant succeeds, the burden shifts back to 
the plaintiff, who can then show that the proffered justification was either a 
pretense or else that a substantially equivalent benefit could be achieved by a less 
restrictive alternative. If a less restrictive alternative is available, the court 
condemns the restraint because the same effects could have been achieved in a 
less anticompetitive manner. If no such alternative is offered or available, the 
court must balance the anticompetitive effects of the restraint against the 
nonpretextual defense.
138
 
Although NCAA input market restraints with clear anticompetitive effects and no 
procompetitive justifications (e.g., REC rule) can be invalidated under a “quick look” or 
truncated rule of reason, as occurred in Law, Board of Regents generally requires use of the full 
rule of reason in analyzing NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules or other input market restraints 
adversely affecting their economic interests.  In analyzing the NIL compensation rules, 
O’Bannon applied a three-step full rule of reason process, which considers a restraint’s 
anticompetitive effects, procompetitive effects, and less restrictive alternatives without any 
balancing to determine its net competitive effects.
139
  
By contrast, Law’s full rule of reason analysis consists of four-steps, with the last one 
requiring such balancing if the parties satisfy their respective burdens under the first three steps: 
[T]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that an agreement has a 
substantially adverse effect on competition. . . . If the plaintiff meets this burden, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of the 
procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct. . . . If the defendant is 
able to demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff then must prove that the 
challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate 
objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a substantially less 
restrictive manner. . . . Ultimately, if these steps are met, the harms and benefits 
must be weighed against each other in order to judge whether the challenged 
behavior is, on balance, reasonable.
140
 
1. NCAA Input Market Restraints Have Significant Anticompetitive Effects Requiring 
Procompetitive Justification 
Because NCAA member universities compete for the services of student-athletes, NCAA 
student-athlete eligibility rules and other input market restraints preclude or limit intrabrand 
competition.  Relying on Mandeville Island Farms, the O’Bannon district court rejected the 
NCAA’s assertion that plaintiffs must prove that this restraint “harms consumers by reducing 
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output or raising prices in a downstream market”141 (i.e., reduces interbrand competition in the 
sports entertainment market).  This ruling, which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,
142
 correctly 
interprets Mandeville Island Farms and is consistent with Law as well as other cases holding that 
professional sports labor market restraints have significant anticompetitive effects under section 
1 even without harming consumers.  
Like the REC rule in Law, the NCAA’s amateurism eligibility rules fix prices in the input 
market for the production of college sports.  Over time the REC rule would harm consumer 
welfare by reducing the quality of intercollegiate athletics by misallocating labor market 
resources because coaches would refuse to accept artificially low salaries and seek alternative 
employment outside of college sports.
143
  Although the NIL compensation rules precluded 
student-athletes from receiving any compensation for their NIL rights, their effects on consumer 
welfare are uncertain. It also is difficult to accurately determine or predict whether other NCAA 
amateurism eligibility rules also cause a similar misallocation of student-athlete playing services 
with adverse consumer welfare effects. 
These restraints may reduce the quality of intercollegiate athletics to the detriment of 
consumer welfare by reducing the quantity of eligible student-athletes or by causing them to turn 
professional earlier than if such rules did not exist in a free market.  The NBA and NFL CBAs 
establish legally enforceable player eligibility rules that preclude employment in the NBA until 
reaching the age of nineteen years old, and in the NFL until three years have elapsed since 
graduating from high school, respectively.
144
  After satisfying these requirements, student-
athletes with remaining college eligibility may choose to pursue an NBA or NFL career rather 
than continuing to play NCAA basketball or football without any payment or economic benefits 
in excess of the value of a full cost-of-attendance scholarship.  As the Ninth Circuit observed: 
“athletes might well be more likely to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that 
they were earning some amount of NIL income while they were in school.”145 
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Even if the NCAA’s amateurism eligibility rules do not cause a misallocation of 
resources that harms consumer welfare, NIL compensation rules and other rules prohibiting price 
competition among NCAA schools likely transfer wealth from student-athletes to universities 
and third parties such as coaches earning high salaries, which arguably is an anticompetitive 
effect.
146
   
2. Judicially Accepted Procompetitive Justifications Should Enhance Consumer Welfare 
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA has a “heavy burden” of 
establishing a procompetitive objective that justifies a restraint’s anticompetitive effects.147 
O’Bannon required the NCAA to prove the restraint “brings about some procompetitive effect in 
order to justify it” under the rule of reason.148  Because “the Sherman Act [is] a ‘consumer 
welfare prescription,’”149 Board of Regents recognized product availability/differentiation, 
competitive balance, and increased output as procompetitive justifications for NCAA rules and 
regulations that eliminate or reduce intrabrand economic competition among NCAA schools.  In 
other words, the NCAA must prove that a student-athlete eligibility rule or input market restraint 
causing significant anticompetitive effects in an intrabrand market has offsetting procompetitive 
effects in the interbrand entertainment market. In general, this effectively requires the NCAA to 
establish that the restraint benefits consumers of intercollegiate athletics.    
a. Product Availability/Differentiation 
   Intercollegiate and professional sports have several distinguishing features and are 
different brands of entertainment for a variety of reasons.  In general, the Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized that “[t]he identification of [intercollegiate athletics] with an academic 
tradition differentiates [it] from . . . professional sports to which it might otherwise be 
comparable”150  and that “the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds 
richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics.”151  More specifically, NFL football differs 
from NCAA Division I FBS football (just as NBA basketball differs from Division I men’s 
basketball) because of their differing quality of athletes, caliber of on-field competition, length of 
season, and methods of determining teams that participate in postseason championship 
competition.  
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In Board of Regents dicta, the Court conflated amateurism with its clearly recognized and 
economically sound procompetitive defenses of brand differentiation and competitive balance by 
stating “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product’ [college sports], athletes 
must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”152  It also stated that 
“maintaining competitive balance among amateur athletic teams is legitimate and important”153 
and noted the “revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.”154  The Court also assumed 
that “fostering competition among amateur athletic teams” is a procompetitive means of 
“enhance[ing] public interest in intercollegiate athletics.”155 
For purposes of determining the underlying basis of a sports entertainment product’s 
availability or brand differentiation, “[t]he relevant antitrust question is whether [an intrabrand 
restraint is necessary to] create a qualitatively distinct type of athlete and athletic product that, 
because of its distinctiveness, provides a large number of consumers with a product they greatly 
desire and could not otherwise get.”156  It is not generally accepted or readily apparent that the 
NCAA-defined “amateur” status of student-athletes is the determinative or primary factoror 
even a significant onethat distinguishes college and professional sports for purposes of their 
consumer appeal.
157
  Rather than making any unwarranted assumptions, “the question of how 
much of the consumer utility generated by intercollegiate athletics is dependent upon the 
limitations on athlete compensation is one of fact that would have to be developed in a full 
record,” for example, by surveys and statistical evidence.158  
In a pretrial ruling, the O’Bannon district court held that whether amateurism increases 
the popularity of Division I sports is a fact question to be resolved at trial because the parties’ 
evidence is conflicting.
159
 The NCAA’s experts contended that historically “consumers generally 
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favor the amateur nature of college sports,” and 68.9% of consumers in a recent survey were 
opposed to paying college football and basketball players.
160
 Plaintiffs’ evidence “that the 
NCAA has changed its definition of amateurism several times over the years without 
significantly affecting consumer demand for its product”161 suggests that the popularity of 
college sports is unrelated to the NCAA’s amateurism rules.   
At trial, the court found that “consumer demand for FBS football and Division I 
basketball-related products is not driven by the restrictions on student-athlete compensation but 
instead by other factors such as school loyalty and geography.”162 However, it concluded: 
the NCAA’s restrictions on student-athlete compensation play a limited role in 
driving consumer demand for FBS football and Division I basketball-related 
products. Although they might justify a restriction on large payments to student-
athletes while in school, they do not justify the rigid prohibition on compensating 
student-athletes, in the present or future, with any share of licensing revenue 
generated from the use of their names, images, and likenesses.
163
 
The O’Bannon Ninth Circuit panel broadly construed this factual finding by determining 
that “the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases their appeal to consumers.”164  It suggested 
that NCAA-defined amateurism is itself a procompetitive justification, which is contrary to trial 
evidence that “consumer demand typically does not decrease when athletes are permitted to 
receive payment, and that this general principle holds true across a wide variety of sports and 
competitive formats.”165 More specifically, four experts testified “that providing student-athletes 
with small amounts of compensation above their cost of attendance would not have a significant 
impact on consumer interest in college sports.”166 The dissent appropriately concluded that “the 
concept of amateurism is relevant only insofar as it relates to consumer interest.”167  Thus, a 
more accurate, evidence based conclusion is that maintaining “amateurism” is not a separate and 
distinct procompetitive justification for anticompetitive NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules 
and other input market restraints.  Rather, the NCAA’s amateurism rules are merely one factor 
differentiating intercollegiate and professional sports for purposes of product differentiation, 
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which has important implications likely to be outcome determinative in analyzing whether a 
particular restraint actually furthers this procompetitive objective.  
b. Competitive Balance 
Because doing so ostensibly increases product quality and consumer welfare, Board of 
Regents and American Needle held that promoting on-field competitive balance among sports 
teams is a procompetitive justification for intrabrand restraints on the market for intercollegiate 
or professional player services.
168
 “Competitive balance” has the dual meaning of “parity” 
(i.e., the extent to which all teams playing at the same level are able to play close and 
exciting games during a season of competition) and “potential to change” (i.e., teams’ 
ability to improve their relative performance in terms of on- field success vis-à-vis other 
teams over time).
169
  As applied to NCAA regulation of intercollegiate athletics, the 
determinative issue “is whether restricting the ways individual schools can ‘compete’ to improve 
their relative athletic strength enhances either parity or the ability for relative change in rankings”170 
among schools whose athletic teams regularly compete against each other.  
 The O’Bannon district court held that “a sports league’s efforts to achieve the optimal 
competitive balance among its teams may serve a procompetitive purpose if promoting such 
competitive balance increases demand for the league’s product.”171  Although promoting 
competitive balance among Division I FBS football and basketball teams is a legitimate 
procompetitive justification, it rejected this defense because “the NCAA did not present 
sufficient evidence . . . that its restrictions on student-athlete compensation actually have any 
effect on competitive balance, let alone produce an optimal level of competitive balance.”172  
The court’s standard is consistent with the consumer welfare objectives of antitrust law as 
well as judicial precedent rejecting the claims of professional sports leagues that player labor 
market restraints are necessary to promote competitive balance.
173
  However, it imposes a high 
burden of proof on the NCAA, which may be more than Supreme Court precedent requires.  
Even if the NCAA only needs to prove that a challenged restraint is reasonably necessary to 
promote competitive balance, it will be very difficult to justify any student-athlete eligibility 
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rules or input market restraints applicable to all of its more than 1,100 member schools. NCAA 
schools generally compete regularly only against others within their respective NCAA divisions 
(e.g., Division I FBS and FCS, II, and III) and athletic conferences, so the vast majority of 
association wide student-athlete amateurism eligibility rules (e.g., an absolute prohibition against 
student-athletes’ individualized commercial exploitation of their NIL rights) or input market 
restraints likely are overbroad and may not survive less restrictive alternative analysis.
174
  
c. Increasing Output of Intercollegiate Athletics  
 
 Consistent with Board of Regents,
175
 the O’Bannon district court held that increasing 
“the total ‘output’ of Division I football and basketball, as measured by the total 
number of teams, players, scholarships, and games . . . is potentially procompetitive 
because it increases output in the relevant market.”176 At trial, it found that the 
NCAA’s NIL compensation rules do not increase output in this market because the 
NCAA did not prove that “a significant number of schools choose to compete in 
Division I because of a ‘philosophical commitment to amateurism.”177  Moreover, 
“to the extent that schools achieve any cost savings by not paying their student-
athletes, there is no evidence that those cost savings are being used to fund 
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additional teams or scholarships.”178   
 
  The court rejected the NCAA’s defense that its amateurism rules enable its 
member schools to offer and fund women’s sports and less popular men’s sports 
because it “is not a legitimate procompetitive justification.”179 It explained: “The 
NCAA cannot restrain competition in the ‘college education’ market for Division I football 
and basketball recruits or in the ‘group licensing’ market for Division I football and 
basketball teams' publicity rights in order to promote competition in those markets for 
women’s sports or less prominent men’s sports.”180 
 
  Its rejection of cross subsidization as a procompetitive defense to NCAA 
amateurism rules that fix prices for student-athletes’ playing services is consistent with 
Brown University, which held that the Ivy Overlap Group’s agreement to eliminate price 
competition for talented students “cannot be justified solely on the basis of social welfare 
concerns” such as increasing the socioeconomic diversity of their student bodies.181  
 
d. Integration of Education and Athletics 
 
In O’Bannon, both the district court and Ninth Circuit held that integrating academics and 
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athletics is a procompetitive justification because it enhances the quality of higher education 
services provided to student-athletes.
182
  Both courts rejected the NCAA’s defense that denying 
student-athletes any compensation other than athletic scholarships, including specifically 
pursuant to its NIL compensation rules, achieves this objective.
183
  Absent this restraint, the 
district court found that “schools’ incentives to support their student-athletes academically would 
remain changed,” so they would satisfy NCAA academic progress rules and remain eligible to 
participate in intercollegiate athletics.
184
  It also found that absent this restraint, student-athletes’ 
incentive to perform well academically would not decline and might even increase if “if they 
were required to meet these academic requirements as a condition of receiving [NIL 
compensation].”185 The court concluded “the NCAA may not use this goal to justify its sweeping 
prohibition on any student-athlete compensation, paid now or in the future, from licensing 
revenue generated from the use of student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses,”186 with 
which the Ninth Circuit majority disagreed in applying less restrictive alternative analysis.
187
  
 
3. Less Restrictive Alternative Analysis: A Useful Tool To Invalidate Restraints Not 
Reasonably Necessary To Produce Intercollegiate Athletics  
Although its use has not been explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court, lower courts 
generally use less restrictive alternative analysis in applying the rule of reason.
188
  Most circuit 
courts require the plaintiff to prove the existence of a less restrictive alternative, which varies in 
a range from what is “‘least restrictive’ to ‘reasonably necessary’” to achieve the defendant’s 
procompetitive objectives.
189
  It considers possible alternative action other than the challenged 
restraint to achieve a procompetitive objective and avoids the need for judicial determination and 
comparison of net competitive effects in a market with and without the challenged restraint.
190
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Properly applied, less restrictive alternative analysis is a useful judicial analytical tool to 
determine if a sports industry restraint is reasonably necessary in cases in which there are 
anticompetitive effects in one market (e.g., reduction of intrabrand competition in the player 
services input market) and procompetitive effects in another market (e.g., promotion of 
interbrand competition in the entertainment market).  In unique industries such as professional or 
intercollegiate sports that require agreements among competing clubs or universities to produce 
on-field competition in a form attractive to consumers, there is the danger that it “can be used in 
almost any case to strike down otherwise procompetitive rules”191 or to judicially micromanage 
their production. To ameliorate this risk, the plaintiff should have the burden of proving a 
“dominant alternative” that is “not only less restrictive, but also equally (or more) effective” in 
achieving defendant’s procompetitive objective.192   
In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit required plaintiffs to prove that the NCAA’s 
procompetitive objectives of promoting amateurism and integrating academics with athletics 
“can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”193 This is the same standard adopted 
by Law and Smith in applying less restrictive alternative analysis to other NCAA and 
professional sports league input market restraints that reduce intrabrand competition for the 
services of coaches and professional athletes.
194
  The court acknowledged Board of Regents’ 
admonition to “generally afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend college sports”195  as 
well as that “courts should not use antitrust law to make marginal adjustments to broadly 
reasonable market restraints” or tweak every market restraint that the court believes could be 
improved
 .”196 It required plaintiffs to “make a strong evidentiary showing its alternatives are 
viable” (i.e., “‘virtually as effective’ in serving the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA’s 
current rules and ‘without significantly increased cost’”).197  
Applying this standard, which effectively required the plaintiffs to prove a “dominant 
alternative,” the Ninth Circuit ruled that allowing NCAA universities to provide full cost-of-
attendance scholarships “would have virtually no impact on amateurism . . . because all the 
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money given to students would be going to cover their ‘legitimate costs’ to attend school.”198 It 
also would not impede their integration of student-athletes into their academic communities. 
Because new NCAA rules that became effective after the district court’s decision currently 
permit schools to offer full cost-of-attendance scholarships, it found that this alternative would 
not significantly increase their costs. 
Based on its ruling that maintaining amateurism is a legitimate procompetitive 
justification, the O’Bannon majority used less restrictive alternative analysis to rule that the 
NCAA’s former rules capping the value of an athletic scholarship below the full cost-of-
attendance is broader than reasonably necessary to achieve this objective. This holding enables 
the NCAA to maintain the unique core characteristic of intercollegiate athletics (i.e., its academic 
tradition), which is a significant distinguishing factor vis-à-vis professional sports, and does not 
inhibit the integration of student-athletes into universities. Although this holding effectively 
redefines NCAA “amateurism” and arguably does constitute the application of a de facto least 
restrictive alternative standard in this particular case, invalidating the NIL zero compensation 
rules is judicially appropriate because this restraint “is patently and inexplicably stricter than 
necessary.”199  In principle, this stringent standard appropriately precludes the use of less 
restrictive alternative analysis to invalidate NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and input 
market restraints that are reasonably necessary to further procompetitive objectives.  If adopted 
and followed by other courts, it should avoid judicial micromanaging of intercollegiate athletics.  
The O’Bannon majority reversed the district court’s determination that allowing Division 
I basketball and FBS football players to receive $5,000 cash stipends for their NIL rights after 
their intercollegiate athletics career ends is a substantially less restrictive alternative.  By 
definition, allowing them to receive compensation “untethered to their education expenses” is 
not a “virtually as effective” means of maintaining amateurism in NCAA athletics.  In other 
words, despite the substantially commercialized nature of Division I basketball and FBS football, 
the majority holds that all NIL rights compensation received by those who currently or formerly 
played these two sports must be tethered to the costs of their educational opportunities.
200
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compensation if they maintained their academic eligibility while playing intercollegiate sports 
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If maintaining amateurism is relevant only to the extent necessary to distinguish 
intercollegiate and professional sports from the perspective of consumers, the dissent’s view that 
the district court properly used less restrictive analysis to fashion a remedy to achieve this 
objective is incorrect.  Based on the record evidence, principled rule of reason analysis consistent 
with the objectives of antitrust law would have required the district court to rule that NCAA rules 
fixing student-athletes’ NIL compensation at zero are not reasonably necessary to maintain the 
limited role of amateurism in product differentiation and, therefore, are illegal and 
unenforceable.  Its use of less restrictive alternative analysis to judicially determine a reasonable 
amount of NIL rights compensation for student-athletes is erroneous because “[t]he point of the 
less restrictive alternative test is not to turn the antitrust court into a price regulator, but rather to 
find competitive alternatives to a challenged restraint.”201  However, the appropriate antitrust 
remedy of simply invalidating the NCAA’s zero NIL compensation rules, which would enable 
free market competition to determine student-athletes’ payments from their respective 
universities and third parties for use of their NILs, would be the first step towards 
professionalization of intercollegiate sports with corresponding adverse consequences.
202
   
Although it needs to be applied with judicial caution and consistent with the stringent 
O’Bannon standard, the use of less restrictive alternative analysis may be particularly useful in 
determining whether challenged NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules (e.g., transfer rules) or 
other input market restraints (e.g., per sport limits on the number of athletic scholarships) are 
reasonably necessary to achieve competitive balance in intercollegiate athletics.  An NCAA or 
Division-wide restraint may be overbroad; a substantially less restrictive alternative that achieves 
legitimate procompetitive objectives relevant to intercollegiate sports may be permitting athletic 
conferences within NCAA Divisions to independently establish their own rules, just as NCAA 
autonomy legislation is enabling the Division I Power Five conferences to do.
203
  For example, a 
conference rule imposing an academic residency requirement for intra-conference student-athlete 
transfers is much less restrictive than a similar NCAA or Division rule that applies nationwide.
204
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Some have suggested that “the shifting of amateurism rules from the national level to the 
conference level, with individual conferences competing against one another to set the most 
desirable terms of athlete employment”205 as a possible less restrictive alternative.  However, this 
would require judicial rejection of an amateur model of intercollegiate athletics with all 
payments to student-athletes tethered to the costs of educational opportunities.  On the other 
hand, courts should not improperly micromanage NCAA governance of intercollegiate athletics 
by tweaking restrictions proven as a matter of fact to further competitive balance among 
university athletic teams that regularly play games and compete in championship competitions 
against each other; for example, by enjoining enforcement of the current rule capping Division I 
FBS football scholarship at eighty-five in favor of a cap of ninety scholarships.     
4. Balancing Anticompetitive and Procompetitive Effects 
O’Bannon and Law disagree regarding whether a fourth step, the balancing of 
anticompetitive effects, is a necessary requirement of full rule of reason analysis if the parties 
satisfy their respective burdens of proof.  Although this is an important issue of general antitrust 
jurisprudence and Law represents the majority judicial view,
206
 the antitrust validity of most 
NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules or other input market restraints can be judicially 
determined without any balancing to determine the net competitive effects of the restraint, which 
is a very complex and difficult endeavor.
207
 One scholar has observed: “In the vast majority of 
rule of reason cases, even complex ones like O’Bannon, real balancing is not necessary. The 
series of steps—first prima facie case, then defense, and occasionally inquiry into less restrictive 
alternatives—will be sufficient.”208 Although one scholar suggests that the O’Bannon majority 
erred by not balancing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the NIL zero 
compensation rules after determining that permitting a $5,000 stipend is not a less restrictive 
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alternative,
209
 doing so would not have changed their remedy of permitting plaintiffs to receive a 
stipend not to exceed the value of a full cost-of-attendance athletic scholarship at their respective 
universities.  
Conclusion 
Case-by-case litigation to resolve the antitrust validity of particular NCAA student-
athlete eligibility rules is not an optimal method of externally regulating intercollegiate sports 
competition among nonprofit institutions of higher education. It has resulted in conflicting 
judicial decisions creating legal uncertainty rather than a principled and predictable application 
of antitrust law as well as being very expensive
210
 and time consuming.
211
  In applying antitrust 
law, with the exception of O’Bannon, courts traditionally have been very deferential to the 
NCAA and upheld its self-defined amateurism regulations without close scrutiny under the rule 
of reason.  This approach is consistent with judicial, NLRB, and state legislative refusals to 
professionalize intercollegiate athletics by characterizing student-athletes as “employees” under 
labor, employment, and worker’s compensation laws, but it is inconsistent with general and 
professional sports antitrust law principles.  To enable the achievement of legitimate social 
welfare objectives in higher education (which are not procompetitive objectives for purposes of 
antitrust law), an alternative system of regulating intercollegiate athletics that provides antitrust 
immunity is a better legal regime.  The use of antitrust law is a second best solution, but judicial 
adoption of the foregoing recommendations will better promote consumer welfare, protect 
student-athletes’ economic rights, and permit the NCAA to promote the unique features of 
intercollegiate sports without unwarranted judicial micromanagement.    
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